Land value taxation (LVT) (or site value taxation) is an ad valorem tax where only the value of land itself is taxed. This ignores buildings, improvements, and personal property. Because of this, LVT is different from other property taxes which generally tend to fall on real estate - the combination of land and improvements to land.
Land value taxation is ancient, tracing back to early governments after the introduction of agriculture. One of the oldest forms of taxation, it was originally based on crop yield. This early version of the tax required simply sharing the yield at the time of the harvest, akin to paying a yearly rent.[1] In modern times, every jurisdiction that has a real estate property tax has an element of land value tax, because part of the ad valorem basis for real estate is the location, or site value, in addition to the improvement value.[2]
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Economic effects
High efficiency
Most taxes distort economic decisions.[3] If labor, buildings or machinery and plants are taxed, people are dissuaded from constructive and beneficial activities, and enterprise and efficiency are penalized due to the excess burden of taxation. This does not apply to LVT, which is payable regardless of whether or how well the land is actually used, because the supply of land is inelastic, market land rents depend on what tenants are prepared to pay rather than on the expenses of landlords, and so LVT cannot be passed on to tenants.[4] The only alleged direct effect of LVT on prices is to lower the market price of land. Put another way, LVT is often said to be justified for economic reasons because if it is implemented properly, it will not deter production, distort market mechanisms or otherwise create deadweight losses the way other taxes do.[5] A correlation between the use of LVT at the expense of traditional property taxes and greater market efficiency is predicted by economic theory, and has been observed in practice.[6][page number needed][7]
Proponents allege that the necessity to pay the tax encourages landowners to develop vacant and under-used land properly or to make way for others who will. The claim is that because LVT deters speculative land holding, dilapidated inner-city areas are returned to productive use, reducing the pressure to build on green-field sites and so reducing urban sprawl.[8] For example Harrisburg, Pennsylvania has taxed land at a rate six times that on improvements since 1975, and this policy has been credited by its long time mayor, Stephen R. Reed with reducing the number of vacant structures in downtown Harrisburg from about 4,200 in 1982 to less than 500. LVT is an ecotax because it ostensibly discourages the waste of locations, which are a finite natural resource.[9][10][11]
Reduced speculation
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Real estate bubbles direct savings towards rent seeking activities rather than other investments, and can contribute to recessions which damage the entire economy. Advocates of the land tax claim that it reduces the speculative element in land pricing, thereby leaving more money for productive capital investment and making the economy more stable.[12]
Land pricing and the economic cycle
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The underlying value of land is its annual rental. Land title purchase is the purchase of the stream of rental income. At the start of an economic cycle, the price can be, for the sake of argument, about 20 times the rental ie 5%. The return on land is then roughly the same as the return from a bank deposit. But expectations of rising rental values gradually drive up prices, to, say about 25 times rental in the early stages of an economic up-cycle. (the figures are illustrative). At this point, about three years on into the cycle, land/asset titles start to be traded in their own right on the expectation of capital growth. The same applies to houses, even though these are purchased primarily as places to live. The prospect of rising prices gives credence to the notion of a "housing ladder" which people have to climb on to. The market becomes increasingly "buoyant", with lenders increasingly willing to lend, safe in the knowledge that their loan is secured on the collateral of an asset whose value is on a rising trend.
But this willingness to lend itself drives up prices, and now, a self-feeding bubble begins to develop. But rents continue to rise only with the general increase in prosperity, and the percentage yield is now on a falling trend. There comes a time when loan repayments are significantly higher than rental incomes, and at this point the bubble is primed to burst, which happens as soon as an event occurs to disturb the trend.
Borrowers start to default, and properties are repossessed and sold. This halts and then reverses the rising price trend and lenders find themselves with collateral that is worth less than the amount lent. The bubble then collapses.
Fred Harrison has claimed that these cycles have occurred since about 1800 with a periodicity of around 18 years, disturbed only by the two world wars.[citation needed]
On this analysis, the behaviour of the banks is a secondary phenomenon. It is the operation of the land market that is the underlying cause. It is suggested that by collecting, as public revenue, almost the entire rental value of land through an ad valorem tax on its annual value, the land price cycle could be prevented at source.
Loss of asset value
The selling price of land titles is proportional to the expected net rental income stream, so LVT would reduce the capital value of all real estate owners' holdings by an amount equal to the capitalisation of the tax. Critics suggest that a rapid reduction of real estate values could have profoundly negative effects on banks and other financial institutions whose asset portfolios are dominated by real estate mortgage debt, and could thus threaten the soundness of the whole financial system.[13] However, the domination of investment portfolios by land (in the form of real estate) is the principal cause of instabilities in the financial system, and is responsible for boom-bust events such as that which has began to affecting the world economy in 2007.
If the value to landowners were reduced to zero or near zero by recovering effectively all its rent, total privately held asset values could decline as the land value element was stripped out, representing, on paper, a massive reduction of private sector wealth. In the longer term, however, there would be a benefit as investment in land as such adds nothing to productive capacity, since it is merely a transfer of title ownership. Most LVT supporters support a gradual tax shift to avoid disrupting the economy, and argue that the reduction in private rent collection would result in a corresponding increase in net wages received from work and entrepreneurial activity.
Implementation
There are several practical issues involved in the implementation of a land value tax. Most notably, it needs to be:
- Calculated fairly and accurately,
- High enough to raise sufficient revenue without causing land abandonment,
- Billed to the correct person, and
- Legal in the jurisdiction in which it is applied.
Sufficiency of revenue
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Some have argued that a land value tax alone cannot raise large enough revenues if LVT were to replace all other taxes.[14] But this ignores the fact that as existing taxes come off, individuals and businesses are left with more of their wages and profits. The continued operation of the market means that land users would use at least some of the these additional retained amounts to bid up land values, thereby making the tax base larger. A reduction in vehicle fuel duties would also push up land values by reducing transport costs.
It is also argued that LVT would reduce government expenditure on welfare. In a study for the Institute of Economic Affairs, Harrison has calculated that the indirect (deadweight) cost of the UK tax system is about 12% of national wealth[15] This imposes substantial costs on the government, for example in welfare payments, many of which would not have to be made under the conditions of full employment which would exist under an LVT regime. Since land value taxation is conceived as a tax shift, there is no reason for concern that a land value tax could not raise sufficient revenue in the hypothetical situtation that it replaced all other taxes. This is a logical consequence of the law of rent; the rental value of land is the surplus after all other claims on production have been met. If no taxes are levied on inputs, then a larger surplus remains, providing a larger rental value and consequently larger tax base.
In a case or event where a jurisdiction attempted to levy a land tax that was higher than the entire landowner surplus, it would result in the abandonment of property by those who would be paying and a sharp decline in tax revenue.[16] Such a possibility can, however, only arise where land value taxation is based on capital values, since it may not be clear precisely how these relate to rental values, being influenced by interest rates and future expectations. Under an annual rental value assessment system, the maximum tax rate that can be levied is 100%, since an attempt to levy tax at more than 100% of rental value would result in abandonment. If land was being abandoned under a rental value assessment tax regime, it would be proof that the valuations were wrong, since actual rental value is the landowner surplus. In practice, any competent system of administration must incorporate an equitable appeals procedure, in which case values would have been reassessed long before that stage was reached.
Requires clear ownership
In some countries, LVT is nearly impossible to implement because of lack of certainty regarding land titles and clearly established land ownership and tenure. If the government can not accurately define ownership boundaries and ascertain the proper owner, it cannot know from whom to collect the tax. The phenomena of lack of clear titles is found world-wide in developing countries[17] and is in part the subject of the work of the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto. In African countries with imperfect land registration, boundaries may be poorly surveyed, the landlord can be elusive and significantly more difficult to tax than occupants, but most governments require that tax collectors track owners down nonetheless so that the burden of the tax does not fall on the poor.[18] Given the political will, however, the compilation of a land register should not be unduly difficult, since the onus can be put on the landowners to register, with the ultimate sanction of forfeit of title should they fail to do so. The use of satellite mapping and geographical information systems should ease the problem of the need for accurate land surveys and solves the difficulty of establishing an ownership database.
Assessment
In theory, levying a Land Value Tax is straightforward, requiring only a valuation of the land and the identity of the landholder. There is no need for the tax payers to deal with complicated forms or to give up personal information as with an income tax. Because land cannot be hidden, removed to a tax haven or concealed in an electronic data system,[19] the tax can not be evaded.
However, critics point out that determining the value of land can be difficult in practice. In a 1796 United States Supreme Court opinion, Justice William Paterson noted that leaving the valuation process up to assessors would cause numerous bureaucratic complexities, as well as non-uniform assessments due to imperfect policies and their interpretations.[20] Austrian School economist Murray Rothbard later raised similar concerns, stating that no government can fairly assess value, which can only be determined by a free market.[21] Such a criticism is to miss the point, that the aim and purpose of land value taxation is that assessments should be based on market evidence.
When compared to modern-day property tax evaluations, valuations of land involve fewer variables and have smoother gradients than valuations that include improvements. This is due to variation of building style, quality and size between lots. Modern computerization and statistical techniques have eased the process; in the 1960s and 1970s, multivariate analysis was introduced as a method of assessing land.[22]
Land value for LVT purposes is assessed using market evidence. Such evidence may comprise both selling prices and rentals. Where development already exists on a site, the value of the site can be discovered by various means, of which the most easily understood is the residual method: the value of the site is the total value of the property minus the depreciated value of buildings and other structures.
The valuation process commences with a measurement of the most and least valuable land within the taxation area. A few sites of intermediate value are then identified and used as "landmark" values. Other values are filled-in between the landmark values. The data is then collated on a database and linked to a Property Reference Number, [23] "smoothed" and mapped using a geographical information system (GIS). The initial valuation is the most difficult. Once the system is bedded-in, successive valuations become easier. Regular valuation is essential if LVT is to function. British experience with property tax valuations suggests that they must be at least quinquennial, but a worthwhile refinement is to revise the valuations annually by statistical methods.
Capital or annual value?
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Land value taxation assessments can be on annual rental values or capital values (selling prices). Both methods have advantages and disadvantages. The original concept of the tax was the collection of rental value, and it is annual rental value which is the primary measure of land value. Selling prices are derived from annual rental values but depend on factors such as interest rates and the economic cycle. At some stages in the cycle, land values include a significant speculative premium, which can make them volatile. In some situations, it could be difficult even to obtain a consistent valuation data set. Rental values, by contrast, are hardly subject to speculative pressure.
A further element of hope value arises when there is the possibility of developing land, especially where there is some form of land use planning in operation and there is uncertainty about what development would be permitted. With annual rental value assessment, doubt over possible development permissions does not arise, since the value is the current use value until consent has been formally granted.
In favour of capital values (selling prices) assessments, it is argued that these values are familiar to more people and there are circumstances where there is an active market in buying and selling, but no significant rental market. It is also easier to deduct building values when these are capital sums. Where annual values are in use, the building values must be decapitalised into annual values, but this is an established valuation technique which can also be employed to enable selling prices to be used to generate rental values.
The selling price of land is also affected by property taxes currently payable, which are reduced by the capitalisation of the tax and must be allowed for if any existing property taxes are to be replaced by land value tax. Under a land value taxation system, if 100% of the rental value was collected, then the capital value of the land would be nil. But this problem would be significant at lower rates of tax. Under rental value assessment, the values remain, since the land value tax rate changes only the proportion of rent collected as tax.
A possible reason why land value taxation could be perceived as unfair can arise particularly with capital value assessment, since, at the peak of the cycle, people could be required to pay a tax based on the bubble-values which could never all be realised. This would cause difficulties for pensioners who were living on fixed incomes, having bought their properties many years earlier, and was one reason for the cutting of the Swedish fastighetsskatt (not a land value tax), a commitment of the Christian Democrats in the September 2006 election, and implemented when that party became a member of the Centre-Right government. Rental value assessments, rising broadly in line with incomes, would not have the same effect.
Legality in the United States
In the United States, there have historically been two alleged legal obstacles to the implementation of land value taxes at the state and local level: uniformity clauses and Dillon's Rule. At the federal level, land value taxation is legal so long as it is apportioned among the states.[24]
Uniformity clauses
The United States legal system includes "uniformity clauses", which require that all taxation is applied evenly within a jurisdiction. Although the federal Uniformity Clause has never been an issue, many state constitutions have their own uniformity clauses, and the wording and interpretation of these clauses varies from state to state. For example in 1898, prior to an amendment of the Maryland Declaration of Rights which now specifically allows for land value taxation, the Maryland supreme court ruled that the use of land value taxation in Hyattsville was unconstitutional.[25] However, the uniformity clause in Pennsylvania has been broadly construed, and land value taxation has been used since 1913.[26]
Each state will have its own legal stance or lack of any stance on LVT; some uniformity clauses explicitly allow some types of classifications of property, some have no uniformity clause, and some do not specifically discuss land qua land at all. Except for the Maryland case of Hyattsville, no state courts have squarely ruled that land and improvements are actually "classes" of property such that uniformity clauses are applicable. As a general rule, as long as each type of property (land, improvements, personal) is taxed uniformly there is no constitutional obstacle. In addition, no court other than the 1898 case in Maryland has actually struck down an attempt to implement land value taxation on the basis of a state uniformity clause.
Even in rather strict uniformity clause states, it is unclear whether the uniformity clause actually prohibits separate land value taxation. Some states have other constitutional provisions - for example in New Jersey, which gives localities maximum home rule authority and have not adopted Dillon's Rule. While the uniformity clauses might be interpreted to prohibit state-wide action, local action may be legitimate.[27]
Dillon's Rule
Although uniformity clauses do not seem to be a major obstacle in most jurisdictions to land value taxation, control of local authority by the state legislature remains a real obstacle, requiring the need for local enabling authority or the abrogation of Dillon's Rule. The theory of state preeminence over local governments was expressed as Dillon's Rule in a 1868 case, where it was stated that "[m]unicipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from, the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so may it destroy. If it may destroy, it may abridge and control."[28] As opposed to Dillon's Rule, the Cooley Doctrine expressed the theory of an inherent right to local self determination. In a concurring opinion, Michigan Supreme Court Judge Thomas Cooley in 1871 stated: "[L]ocal government is a matter of absolute right; and the state cannot take it away."[29] In Maryland, for example, municipal corporations have the right to implement land value taxation, but the counties, including Baltimore City which is treated as a county in Maryland for certain purposes, do not.[25]
Ethics
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- See also: Georgism
Land acquires a scarcity value owing to the competing needs of the community for living, working and leisure space. According to proponents,[30] the unimproved value of land owes nothing to the individual efforts of the landowner and everything to the community at large. These supporters suggest that the value of land belongs justly and uniquely to the community.
In religious terms, it has been claimed that land is a common gift to all of mankind.[31] For example, the Catholic Church asserts:
Everyone knows that the Fathers of the Church laid down the duty of the rich toward the poor in no uncertain terms. As St. Ambrose put it: "You are not making a gift of what is yours to the poor man, but you are giving him back what is his. You have been appropriating things that are meant to be for the common use of everyone. The earth belongs to everyone, not to the rich."[32]
In distributism terms, land value also has been alleged to be much more maldistributed than income. While sizeable numbers of households own no land, few have no income. For example, 10% of land owners (all corporations) in Baltimore, Maryland own 58% of the taxable land value. The bottom 10% of those who own any land own less than 1% of the total land value. This is a form of Gini Coefficient analysis.[33][broken citation] It is because of these distribution issues that land value taxation is sometimes suggested as a moderate, market-based form of land reform.
LVT is also purported to act as value capture tax.[34] A new public works project may make adjacent land go up considerably in value, and thus, with a tax on land values, the tax on adjacent land goes up. Thus, the new public improvements would be paid for by those most benefited by the new public improvements - those whose land value went up most.
History
Pre-modern
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Physiocrats
The physiocrats were a group of economists who believed that the wealth of nations was derived solely from the value of land agriculture or land development. Physiocracy is considered one of the "early modern" schools of economics. Physiocrats called for the abolition of all existing taxes, completely free trade, and a single tax on land; they did not distinguish, however, between intrinsic value of land and ground rent.[35] Their theories originated in France and were most popular during the second half of the 18th century. The movement was particularly dominated by Anne Robert Jacques Turgot (1727–1781) and François Quesnay (1694–1774).[36] It immediately preceded the first modern school, classical economics, which began with the publication of Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations in 1776. Physiocrat influence in the United States came by Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson as Ambassadors to France,[37] and Jefferson brought his friend Pierre du Pont to the United States to promote the idea.[38] A statement in the 36th Federalist Paper reflects that influence, "A small land tax will answer the purpose of the States, and will be their most simple and most fit resource. " [39]
Thomas Paine contended in his Agrarian Justice pamphlet that all citizens should be paid 15 pounds at age 21 "as a compensation in part for the loss of his or her natural inheritance by the introduction of the system of landed property." This proposal was the origin of the citizen's dividend advocated by Geolibertarianism.
Henry George
Henry George (September 2, 1839 – October 29, 1897) was an American political economist and originator of the "Single Tax" on land. He was the author of Progress and Poverty, written in 1879, and is the most influential advocate of land taxation.
The Henry George Foundation of America is a 501(c)(4) non-profit foundation,[40] founded in 1926 by some of the leading progressive Democrats in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Pittsburgh Mayors Scully and McNair, City Assessor Percy Williams, State Senator and Allegheny County Democratic Chairman Bernard B. McGinnis, and Councilman George Evans (driving force behind Buhl Planetarium). Its national office is now located in Philadelphia, where Henry George was born.
The Center for the Study of Economics is a 501(c)(3) non-profit educational foundation,[41] established in 1980 as the sister organization of the Henry George Foundation of America. Its mission is to research land value taxation, to assist governments in implementation and to study the effect of land based property taxation where used. It suggests implementation where appropriate but does not support political candidates or become involved in the electoral process. The Center also gathers and disseminates articles, studies and monographs on the subject of land based taxation.
The HGFA and CSE use assessment data and have tax calculators to illustrate how "two-rate" taxation (lower on improvements and higher on land value) might actually be implemented and the effect on parcel by parcel basis in a variety of jurisdictions. They also sponsor the land value tax projects in Maryland,[42] New York,[43] Indiana,[44] Washington,[45] Pennsylvania,[26] and New Jersey,[46] and were instrumental in providing technical assistance (how to calculate rates, etc.) to the Pennsylvania cities that adopted two-rate taxation in the 1970s-90s. They continue to provide technical assistance and do implementation studies across the United States.
British Liberal Party
In the United Kingdom, LVT was an important part of the platform of the British Liberal Party during the early part of the twentieth century - David Lloyd George and H. H. Asquith proposed "to free the land that from this very hour is shackled with the chains of feudalism".[47] It was also advocated by Winston Churchill early in his career.[48]
The Liberal Party remains committed to a local form of land value taxation.[49] LVT has also been made policy for the English and Scottish Green Parties.[citation needed]
British Labour Party
From its early years, and until just after the Second World War, there was strong support for land value taxation within the British Labour Party. The MP Andrew MacLaren was a consistent and vocal advocate. The 1931 Labour Budget included a land value tax, but before it came into force it was repealed by the Conservative-dominated National Government that followed shortly after.
An attempt at introducing site value taxation in the administrative County of London was made by the local authority under the leadership of Herbert Morrison in the 1938-9 Parliament, called the London Rating (Site Values) Bill. Although it failed, it sets out detailed legislation for the implementation of a system of land value taxation using annual value assessment.[50]
After 1945, the Labour Party adopted the policy, against the opposition of a substantial body of MPs, of attempting to collect "development value" - the increase in land price arising from planning consent. This was one of the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act of 1947 and it was repealed when the Labour government lost power in 1951. Thereafter, interest within the party dwindled.[citation needed]
Contemporary economists
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- In 1990, several economists wrote[51] to then President Mikhail Gorbachev suggesting that Russia use Land Value Taxation in its transition towards a free market economy.[52]
- Milton Friedman noted that "[T]he property tax is one of the least bad taxes, because it’s levied on something that cannot be produced — that part that is levied on the land".[53]
- Nobel Prize winner William Vickrey believed that "removing almost all business taxes, including property taxes on improvements, excepting only taxes reflecting the marginal social cost of public services rendered to specific activities, and replacing them with takes on site values, would substantially improve the economic efficiency of the jurisdiction."[54]
- In 2000, Florenz Plassmann and Nicolaus Tideman wrote[55] that when comparing Pennsylvania cities using a higher tax rate on land value and a lower rate on improvements with similar sized Pennsylvania cities using the same rate on land and improvements, the higher land value taxation leads to increased construction within the jurisdiction.[56][57]
Land value tax systems
United States
Every single state in the United States has some form of property tax on real estate and hence, in part, a tax on land value. There are several cities that use LVT to varying degrees, but LVT in its purest form is not used on state or national levels. Land value taxation was tried in the South during Reconstruction as a way to promote land reform. There have also been several attempts throughout history to introduce land value taxation on a national level. In Hylton v. United States, the Supreme Court directly acknowledged that a Land Tax was constitutional, so long as it was apportioned equally among the states. Two of the associate justices explained in their summaries, stating:
[T]he Constitution declares, ... both in theory and practice, a tax on land is deemed to be a direct tax. ... I never entertained a doubt, that the principal, I will not say, the only, objects, that the framers of the Constitution contemplated as falling within the rule of apportionment, were a capitation tax and a tax on land.[24]
I am inclined to think, but of this I do not give a judicial opinion, that the direct taxes contemplated by the Constitution, are only two, to wit, a capitation, or poll tax, simply, without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstance; and a tax on land.[24]
There have also been attempts since then to introduce land value tax legislation, such as:
- The earliest known legislation was the Federal Property Tax Act of 1798.[58]
- In 1894, a bill was introduced by Representative James G. Maguire of California that would have introduced a Georgist taxation policy.[59]
- On February 20, 1935, Theodore L. Moritz of Pennsylvania introduced HR 6026, which would have implemented a national land value tax. It would have imposed a 1% tax on the value of land in excess of $3,000.
Single tax
The first city in the United States to enact land value taxation was Hyattsville, Maryland in 1898, through the efforts of Judge Jackson H. Ralston. The Maryland Courts subsequently found it to be barred by the Maryland Constitution. Judge Ralston and his supporters commenced a campaign to amend the state Constitution which culminated in the Art. 15 of the Declaration of Rights (which remains today part of the Maryland State Constitution). In addition, he helped see that enabling legislation for towns be passed in 1916, which also remains in effect today.[25][60] In addition, the towns of Fairhope, Alabama and Arden, Delaware were founded as model Georgist communities or "single tax colonies".
Two-rate taxation
Nearly 20 Pennsylvania cities in the USA employ a two-rate or split-rate property tax: taxing the value of land at a higher rate and the value of the buildings and improvements at a lower one. This can be seen as a compromise between pure LVT and an ordinary property tax falling on real estate (land value plus improvement value).[61] Alternatively, two-rate taxation may be seen as a form that allows gradual transformation of the traditional real estate property tax into a pure land value tax.
Nearly two dozen local Pennsylvania jurisdictions (such as Harrisburg)[62] use two-rate property taxation in which the tax on land value is higher and the tax on improvement value is lower. Pittsburgh used the two-rate system from 1913 to 2001[63] when a countywide property reassessment led to a drastic increase in assessed land values during 2001 after years of underassessment, and the system was abandoned in favor of the traditional single-rate property tax. The tax on land in Pittsburgh was about 5.77 times the tax on improvements. Notwithstanding the change in 2001, the Pittsburgh Improvement District still employs a pure land value taxation as a surcharge on the regular property tax.
Other countries
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Pure LVT, apart from real estate or generic property taxation, is used in Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and Estonia. It is currently being introduced in Namibia, and there are campaigns for its introduction to South Korea and Scotland.[64] Many more countries have used it in the past, particularly Denmark[65] and Japan. Many pre-modern societies used land tax systems that were not based on the value of land, but nevertheless approximated a limited LVT by taxing agricultural land according to its yield or expected yield.[citation needed] The English Domesday survey ordered by William the Conqueror can be regarded as a valuation.[citation needed]
Hong Kong is perhaps the best modern example of the successful implementation of a high LVT. The Hong Kong government generates more than 35% of its revenue from land taxes.[66] Because of this, they can keep their other taxes rates low or non-existent and still generate a budget surplus.
Several cities around the world also use LVT, including Sydney, Canberra, and others in Australia.[6][page number needed] An in-depth study under the Chairmanship of Sir Gordon Chalk issued a report[67] in 1986 on the subject of local taxation for the city of Brisbane, Queensland. The report, which examined many alternative means of local finance, sets out comprehensive and concise arguments for LVT.
It has also been used in Mexicali, Mexico.[68]
Notes
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- ^ Seligman, Edwin R. (1937). Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. Macmillan Publishing Company, Incorporated. p. 70. ISBN 0026091305.
- ^ Ginsberg, Steven (1997), "Two cheers for the property tax: everyone hates it, but the property tax has some good attributes that make it indispensible", Washington Monthly, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1316/is_n10_v29/ai_19898072, retrieved on 13 June 2008
- ^ Coughlin (1999) p.263-4
- ^ Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations Book V, Chapter 2, Part 2, Article I: Taxes upon the Rent of Houses:
"Ground-rents are a still more proper subject of taxation than the rent of houses. A tax upon ground-rents would not raise the rents of houses. It would fall altogether upon the owner of the ground-rent, who acts always as a monopolist, and exacts the greatest rent which can be got for the use of his ground. More or less can be got for it according as the competitors happen to be richer or poorer, or can afford to gratify their fancy for a particular spot of ground at a greater or smaller expense. In every country the greatest number of rich competitors is in the capital, and it is there accordingly that the highest ground-rents are always to be found. As the wealth of those competitors would in no respect be increased by a tax upon ground-rents, they would not probably be disposed to pay more for the use of the ground. Whether the tax was to be advanced by the inhabitant, or by the owner of the ground, would be of little importance. The more the inhabitant was obliged to pay for the tax, the less he would incline to pay for the ground; so that the final payment of the tax would fall altogether upon the owner of the ground-rent."
- ^ McCluskey, William J.; Franzsen, Riël C. D. (2005), Land Value Taxation: An Applied Analysis, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., p. 4, ISBN 0754614905, http://books.google.com/books?id=jkogP2U4k0AC&pg=PA73&lpg=PA73&dq=disadvantages+of+land+value+taxation&source=web&ots=Yn2x3XN3gf&sig=tr_q00vD3k9bSE4S3YLY5Qznms8#PPA4,M1.
- ^ a b Land-Value Taxation Around the World, 3rd edition, Robert V. Andelson (Ed) (2000), ISBN 0-631-22614-1
- ^ Smith, Jeffery J. (2001). "Property Tax Shift Successes". The Progress Report. Retrieved on 2008-06-13.
- ^ Foldvary, Fred E. "Geo-Rent: A Plea to Public Economists" (April 2005). [1]
- ^ Mills, David E.. "The Non-Neutrality of Land Value Taxation". National Tax Journal (National Tax Association) 34 (March 1981): 125, 127–128.
- ^ Bentick, Brian L. (1979). "The Impact of Taxation and Valuation Practices on the Timing and Efficiency of Land Use". Journal of Political Economy (The University of Chicago Press) 87 (August 1979): 859–860. doi:. http://www.jstor.org/pss/1831012.
- ^ DiMasi, Joseph A.. "The Effects of Site Value Taxation in an Urban Area: A General Equilibrium Computational Approach". National Tax Journal (National Tax Association) 40 (December 1987): 577–588.
- ^ Wetzel, Dave (2004-09-20). "The case for taxing land". New Statesman. Retrieved on 2008-06-13.
- ^ Smith, Julie P. (June 2000). "Land Value Taxation: A Critique Of 'Tax Reform, A Rational Solution'" (PDF). Australian National University. ISSN 1442-8636 Retrieved on 2008-06-13.
- ^ Posner, Richard A. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 458-59 (3rd ed. 1986)
- ^ Heath, Allister, Real cost of taxes now more than half UK GDP, Institute of Economic Affairs, http://www.iea.org.uk/record.jsp?type=news&ID=320, retrieved on 22 December 2008
- ^ Coughlin (1999) p.265-266.
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References
- Coughlin, J. Anthony. "Land Value Taxation and Constitutional Uniformity", Geo. Mason L. Rev., Winter 1999, Vol. 7, No. 2
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